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Abstract
The European Union has gained salience as an issue in political debate. Recent literature shows that successful radical
right-wing parties are frequently in opposition to European integration. This article looks at how radical left-wing parties’
positions on EU integration affect their electoral support. It argues that radical left parties can mobilize voters in their
favour through positioning in opposition to EU integration because this allows voters to combine their left-wing economic
and anti-EU preferences. Using expert and individual-level survey data, this research demonstrates that radical left-wing
parties that position themselves against EU integration are more likely to gain individuals’ vote choice. This finding is
surprising, given that traditionally radical left-wing parties are defined through their economic, rather than their non-
economic, positions. This article demonstrates that variation in positioning around non-economic issues such as EU
integration can explain differences in voter support across radical left-wing parties.
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Introduction
Before the 2014 European Elections, the German radical
left party Die Linke took up a Eurosceptic position after
intra-party disagreement on EU integration (Meisner,
2013). However, prior to the 2019 European Elections only
a few years later, Die Linke decided to move from their
EU-critical stance to a more pro-EU position (Cveljo,
2019). This position shift coincided with the Eurosceptic
radical right-wing party Alternative für Deutschland gain-
ing momentum. Die Linke is not alone in trying to decide
on the best strategy towards EU integration; many radical
left-wing parties in the past few years have decided to
oppose the radical right by adopting a pro-EU position.
This research asks: could a Eurosceptic position be more
beneficial for radical left parties to gain votes than a pro-
EU position?
Non-economic issues have increasingly been gaining
attention during elections (Dalton, 2002; De Vries, 2018;
Hooghe et al., 2002; Inglehart, 1990; Kriesi et al., 2008).
Voters overall are increasingly polarized on the non-
economic dimension (Green-Pedersen and Otjes, 2019;
Hutter et al., 2016). The increased polarization of voters
on non-economic issues across many countries is also
reflected in a lack of congruence between voters and parties
as ‘on the culture dimension, most parties were found to
have more liberal positions than their voters; while on the
EU dimension, most parties were found to have more pro-
EU positions than their voters’ (Costello et al., 2012: 1228).
This dissonance can also be found within the potential
radical left party (RLP) voter base (Kitschelt and Rehm,
2014). Traditionally, RLPs have been defined almost
exclusively by their redistributive economic policies (see
Bale and Dunphy, 2011; Dunphy and Bale, 2011; March,
2011; March and Rommerskirchen, 2015). This paper
rejects that premise and instead argues that RLPs are not
unidimensional parties. In practice, RLPs do engage with
other social and cultural issues, and their positioning on
such non-economic issues can be an important strategy to
mobilize voters in their favour. Specifically, this paper
shows, both theoretically and empirically, that anti-EU
positions are electorally beneficial for RLPs.
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This research takes an in-depth look at the mixed suc-
cess of RLPs in Western Europe by examining the different
strategies RLPs take towards EU integration. Throughout
the process of dealignment, voters are more likely to be
disenfranchized or not represented in their interests by the
parties in the party system. One prominent group are voters
with left-wing economic preferences but also Eurosceptic
tendencies. Such voters are more likely to vote for a RLP if
the RLP has an anti-EU position. Though the position a
RLP has on the EU is important to their potential voters,
it becomes less important the more economically right-
wing voters get, as they are less likely to support a RLP
due to their economic divergence. Although Euroscepti-
cism seems a good strategy for RLPs in the abstract, the
presence of radical right parties (RRPs) in the party system
constrains RLP’s appeal to voters, in part because voters
may weigh their anti-EU preferences more heavily than
their redistribution positions. Therefore, even if RLPs
move towards a Eurosceptic position, there is little chance
this will help them in the long run if a RRP is occupying the
‘hard Eurosceptic’ issue space (see Walgrave et al., 2012).
I test this theory by employing two different datasets:
the party-level data from Chapel Hill Expert Survey
(CHES) (Bakker et al., 2015), and the individual-level data
from European Social Survey (ESS). The results have sev-
eral implications; RLPs have the ability to mobilize voters
through non-economic issues. However, successful mobi-
lization depends on the absence of a RRP in the party
system. While studies in the past have emphasized the
importance of European integration for RLPs (Beaudonnet
and Gomez, 2017; March and Rommerskirchen, 2015;
Ramiro, 2016; Visser et al., 2014), this research analyses
when Euroscepticism can be beneficial and when it can
harm RLPs’ success. This article adds to a significant grow-
ing literature on how different party families compete in
their own ways. Finally, the research is the first to analyse
RLP strategy on a specific issue in depth and therefore
highlights the diversity in RLP positions and strategy while
also illustrating how party competition effectively influ-
ences voter choice on non-economic issues.
Radical left parties
In his seminal work on the RLP family, March (2011)
argues that RLPs have been shaped through their institu-
tionalization causing a diversity within the party family
from traditional communists to social populists. Yet, RLPs
can be understood as having ‘enough ideological and pol-
icy coherence to justify being conceptualized as a single
party family’ (March & Rommerskirchen, 2015: 41).
According to March’s (2011: 8) definition, RLPs oppose
the ‘socio-economic structure of contemporary capita-
lism . . . [and] advocate alternative economic and power
structures involving a major redistribution of resources’.1
Not only do RLPs emphasize economic issues significantly
more than any other party (Rovny, 2012; Williams and
Ishiyama, 2018), but they also adopt more extreme posi-
tions than their mainstream counterparts (Wagner, 2012).
This paper bases its argument on the assumption that RLPs
are not niche parties but can be conceptualized as issue
entrepreneurs, and thus, are able to communicate their own
policy strategies ‘to succeed in the political market’ (De
Vries and Hobolt, 2020: 4). RLPs are more successful when
they choose a more moderate strategy on the economy and
more extreme strategy on non-economic issues (Krause,
2020). Yet, there has not been any research on the specific
issues and directionality which can cause this success.
General sentiments associated with those supporting
populist or extreme parties is the ‘losers of globalization’
typology (Kriesi et al., 2008). The cleavage between the
winners and losers of globalization shows that while some
benefited, others were disadvantaged by the changes that
came through globalization. As this ‘losers of globaliza-
tion’ group has felt threatened by the opening of borders,
economically but also culturally, the appeal of populist
parties has grown. Supporters of radical parties are usually
associated with strong support for reduction in economic
inequalities (Visser et al., 2014).2 Personal economic depri-
vation has been credited as one of the main reasons indi-
viduals choose to vote for the radical right (Oesch and
Rennwald, 2018; Rydgren, 2012; Werts et al., 2013) and
the radical left (Gomez et al., 2016; Ramiro, 2016; Roo-
duijn et al., 2017). Thus, some of the ‘losers of globaliza-
tion’ voice their grievances in Euroscepticism, from either
an economically critical perspective (for example criticiz-
ing bailing out of banks during the financial crisis and the
Troika programme) or in a culturally critical perspective
(through feeling threatened by migration).
European integration
European integration has moved from a bureaucratic policy
field to a highly polarized and salient issue in European
party systems. This increase in salience started during the
1990s and has grown since (Hooghe and Marks, 2009); in
part, this has been due to political entrepreneurs who
emphasize the issue of European integration (De Vries and
Hobolt, 2012). Mainstream parties usually occupy pro-
integration space and avoid emphasizing the issue
(Green-Pedersen, 2012; Meijers, 2017).3 More specifically,
mainstream left parties typically take economically left-
wing pro-EU positions while mainstream right parties often
occupy economically right-wing pro-EU positions.
The literature has shown that EU integration is consid-
ered a multidimensional issue (Boomgaarden et al., 2011);
certain aspects of European integration can be understood
through a cultural framework; other aspects are better
understood through economic lenses (Hooghe and Marks,
2009; Lerch and Schwellnus, 2006; McLaren, 2007). For
example, while some Euroscepticism is based in demand
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for less migration, other Euroscepticism is rooted in the
idea that the EU is an ‘elite and great power domination
at the expense of the popular classes’ (Halikiopoulou et al.,
2012: 512). Right-wing Eurosceptic parties are usually
associated with the cultural aspect of EU opposition, while
their left-wing alternative traditionally root their scepticism
in economics.
This research understands RLPs as vote seeking parties.
Vote seeking parties will likely make decisions in order to
maximize their vote share. In the context of European inte-
gration, RLPs can either take a pro-EU or Eurosceptic
position. Research has argued that the far-left is fundamen-
tally ‘strongly internationalist’ (Beaudonnet and Gomez,
2017: 321; Bornschier, 2010; March and Mudde, 2005) and
therefore would not oppose EU integration for nationalist
but economic reasons. Eurosceptic RLPs mainly argue that
the EU is a capitalist organization that they fundamentally
oppose. They often argue in favour of reform of or even
withdrawal from the EU (Hooghe et al., 2002). In the case
of Greece, ‘the KKE position is straightforward as the party
carries on its traditional rejection of the EU, completely
opposite of the SYRIZA position’ (Holmes and Roder,
2019: 26), which believes that they can be ‘critical yet
constructive’ (Holmes and Roder, 2019: 28) towards the
EU. Typically, RLP opposition to the EU has been consid-
ered ‘soft Euroscepticism’ as it has been interpreted as
parties being critical of the EU’s current format rather than
in the idea as a whole (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008).4 The
degree of Euroscepticism presented by RLPs considerably
depends on institutional, historical and political factors.
This translates to great diversity in not just how but also
whether they are Eurosceptic. In France, the left was
divided on Europe with PS representing a pro-EU position
and PCF occupying a Eurosceptic stance (Holmes and
Roder, 2019). Past research suggests RLPs specifically see
electoral success when high Euroscepticism is present in
the population (March and Rommerskirchen, 2015). It is
not yet entirely clear whether RLP voters are Eurosceptic or
RLPs thrive in countries with higher levels of Euroscepti-
cism in society (Beaudonnet and Gomez, 2017). For exam-
ple, Visser et al. (2014) found an effect for Eurosceptic
voting among far-left voters. Also, Ramiro (2016) further
shows that radical left voters tend to have higher Euroscep-
tic attitudes than other voters.
Hillen and Steiner (2020) have shown that there is a
significant number of voters with economic left-wing and
culturally right-wing voting preferences that are left out of
party representation. This demand for parties that advocate
for redistribution policies while also positioning on anti-
immigration or Eurosceptic issues is not met in party sys-
tems (Hillen and Steiner, 2020; van der Brug and van
Spanje, 2009). This means, that if there is no left-wing
party representing their views on the EU or Eurosceptic
party that is close to their policy preference on the econ-
omy, these voters are likely to be left unsatisfied with their
supply choices and often not aligned with any particular
party. While there is a rationale to avoid positioning in a
Eurosceptic direction for RLPs, as it may result in losing
pro-EU left-wing voters, an often-overlooked aspect is that
voters may also reward a RLP for a Eurosceptic position.
Though some voters may have a preference for cultural
Euroscepticism, it is not unreasonable to assume that in the
absence of such supply, some of them may choose to vote
for an economic Eurosceptic party over a pro-EU party.
RLPs can benefit from a Eurosceptic position as they
therefore supply opposition to other left-wing parties that
frequently position themselves in favour of EU integration.
RLPs are able to frame this Euroscepticism through eco-
nomic lenses, as the economic dimension is the primary
dimension of those parties, which makes Euroscepticism
reputationally feasible (Elias et al., 2015). Voters are
expected to reward this if they already have left-wing pre-
ferences, thus are part of the potential voter base of RLPs,
and also have anti-EU policy preferences. Though this is
most likely to apply to voters with economic Eurosceptic
preferences, the lack in supply may convince some voters
with cultural Eurosceptic preferences to vote for a RLP.
Due to the underrepresentation of these preferences in the
party systems, voters are likely to vote for a party with
these policy preferences as they are unlikely to be aligned
with another party. Therefore I hypothesize that:
H1: Among more left-wing voters, RLPs are more likely
to gain electoral support when taking a Eurosceptic
position.
Since we know that a RRP entering the party system can
influence the positions of mainstream parties (Abou-Chadi
and Krause, 2020), I argue that RRPs entering the party
system will also affect RLPs. In some cases, RLPs shift
their position on EU integration in response to a successful
RRP. In the case of Finland, VAS became pro-EU to show
opposition to the RRP (Holmes and Roder, 2019). How-
ever, is this an ideal strategy for vote maximization?
Though not all RRPs focus on Euroscepticism, it aligns
clearly with the overall ideology of the party family. When
RRPs enter a party system, their incentive to be Eurosceptic
is far higher than the incentive of mainstream parties to be
Eurosceptic (Vasilopoulou, 2018; Wagner, 2012). For
mainstream parties, this is due to the high costs usually
associated with having a polarizing stand on a technocratic
issue (Hix, 1999; Hooghe et al., 2002; Whitefield and
Rohrschneider, 2015). The EU is a frequent and salient
issue in manifestos of RRPs (Vasilopoulou, 2018). Thus,
if a RRP enters a party system, it will usually occupy the
Eurosceptic policy space. Furthermore, some RRPs pursue
redistributive policies or blur their position on the economy
(Rovny, 2013). Therefore, it is unsurprising that some vot-
ers have moved from left-wing parties to RRPs (Jylhä et al.,
2019), as voters may prioritize their preferences on EU
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integration over their economic preferences or, through
blurring or otherwise, believe that the RRPs have left-
wing economic positions.
Voters are more likely to vote for parties that they per-
ceive as the most competent (Lachat, 2014). This is espe-
cially the case if a party is perceived as more competent
than other parties on a salient issue. Frequently, if a party
owns an issue (such as in the case of the Greens over
environmentalism), voters perceive this party to be the
most competent on such issue. Though an anti-EU position
might not be an issue that RRPs own, it is still likely that
voters will associate Euroscepticism with the RRP, due to
their ownership of nationalism (Gómez-Reino and Llama-
zares, 2013; Vasilopoulou, 2011). It is likely that RRPs will
be seen as so-called ‘issue entrepreneurs’ (De Vries and
Hobolt, 2012). In this case, voters with left-wing economic
preferences will perceive RRPs as more competent on
Euroscepticism than RLPs.
This research argues that a Eurosceptic position would
be vote maximizing for RLPs; yet, the presence of a RRP
could influence this outcome. With the presence of a RRP,
RLPs are facing competition on the Eurosceptic position.
While some RRPs occupy anti-redistribution positions,
many also position left-wing on economic issues. Thus,
RRPs may not only compose of a highly reputable source
for Euroscepticism, due to their ownership of nationalism,
but also supply for the aforementioned cultural right-wing
and economic left-wing gap in the party system. Therefore,
instead of rewarding RLPs for filling this supply gap, voters
may be convinced by the emphasis placed on Euroscepti-
cism by RRPs. Some of the cultural Eurosceptics that, in
absence of another Eurosceptic party, may have been con-
vinced by the economic Euroscepticism from RLPs will
likely vote for RRPs. From this, this article argues that
although a Eurosceptic position of RLPs may be rewarded
by voters, the entry of a RRP can constrain these prospects.
Therefore,
H2: When a RRP is present in the party system, RLPs
are less likely to benefit from a Eurosceptic position.
Data
This paper uses the party positions from the Chapel Hill
Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al., 2015). This is
merged with the individual-level dataset from the European
Social Survey (ESS) (European Social Survey Cumulative
File, 2018). The ESS is a cross-national survey that mea-
sures attitudes, beliefs and political behaviour every 2 years
since 2001. The ESS makes use of newly selected, cross-
sectional samples for their data collection. In this research,
the ESS is used to understand the voting behaviour of the
electorate. As policy positions need to be estimated and are
often considered latent variables, expert’s judgement is
used as an estimate in this research to understand where
the parties are located on the relevant issues.5 The CHES
surveys country experts on questions of the positioning of
political parties in their respective countries. Once all
experts have submitted their judgement on where the par-
ties are positioned on the issue scales, the average of the
expert responses makes up the final estimated party posi-
tion. The CHES was selected as experts and voters alike
will base their information on speeches, media appearances
and overall party statements. This is contrary to using man-
ifestos to determine party positions, as they are not widely
read by voters.6 From both datasets, this research only
makes use of data from Western European countries, for
comparative clarity in terms of party competition, party
legacy and to provide a more stable comparison of the
issues concerning the EU. The data cover Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Por-
tugal, Spain and Sweden. This is selected due to data
availability and the existence of a RLP in the party system.7
I use ESS rounds from 2002 to 2016 and CHES years until
2014. As a result of the focus on this period, there is also a
strong implication that voters are less ambiguous towards
the EU than they were prior to the 2000s (Duchesne et al.,
2013; Hurrelmann et al., 2015).
The pooled cross-sectional data is obtained by combing
data from ESS with CHES party position data for RLPs. As
the datasets do not match perfectly in years (ESS collects
data every 2 years while CHES roughly every 4), the clo-
sest years were used to match the datasets, using the earlier
years of CHES to match later years of ESS (e.g. for the
CHES round of 2010, the ESS data of round 6 in 2012 was
used).8 Due to the hierarchical structure of the data (voters,
country, years), a multilevel mixed logistic model is
applied. As there are multiple years per country, random
intercepts for each country and country-election were used.
The dependent variable understands whether an individ-
ual voted for a RLP in the previous election using a binary
variable. When two or more RLPs were present in the party
system, the main relevant party was selected. This was
achieved by using the most stable entered RLP to ensure
voter’s knowledge of the party’s existence. In the case of
Greece, the party selected was SYRIZA.9 In the case of
Portugal, the data includes BE.10 This research looks at the
demand-side of the success of RLPs on a more micro-level
and builds on existing research by March and Rommers-
kirchen (2015), Hernández and Kriesi (2016) and Gritter-
sova et al. (2016) who use aggregate data. Non-voters are
excluded from the analysis as the population of interest is
voters.
This research assumes that the effect of Euroscepticism
on RLP vote choice will be stronger for the potential voters
of RLPs, who are most likely more left-wing voters. Thus, a
left-right self-identification variable is included and is also
interacted with the main independent variable. The main
independent variable is RLPs position on EU integration.
CHES takes the averages of the experts’ responses, which
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were used in this research. Though this is treated as con-
tinuous, the marginal effects in the results below are dis-
played as dichotomous for ease of interpretation.
An important control is positions of mainstream parties,
in which the main centre-left and centre-right parties of
each were selected following Abou-Chadi and Wagner
(2020). Their positions were operationalized in the same
manner as the independent variable above. The presence of
a credible RRP was recorded when their vote share
exceeded 3% (Abou-Chadi and Wagner, 2020). Robustness
checks included using different country-level controls and
excluding overly influential cases (e.g. SYRIZA) from the
case selection (Beaudonnet and Gomez, 2017; Gomez
et al., 2016; Krause, 2020). Dropping these cases shows
that they have not driven the results. Further controls
include country-level measurements like migration rate
(net migration using OECD), GDP change per capita and
unemployment are used.11
Age, education and social class have also been used as
controls in this research. The class coding is based on the
category scheme by Oesch (2006), who codes class into
eight separate categories. Class is important to control for
as some evidence suggests that the electorate of RLPs has
predominantly consisted of working-class votes (Moscho-
nas 2002), while other research found that recently it has
become more difficult for RLPs to stay in touch with the
working-class voter base (Knapp, 2004). More middle-
class voters have recently gained interest in voting for a
RLP, in particular public service white collar workers
(González, 2004). Education is divided into three cate-
gories; tertiary; upper secondary and non-tertiary; lower
secondary or less. Hakhverdian et al. (2013: 18) finds ‘peo-
ple with low or medium levels of educational attain-
ment . . . [are] significantly more eurosceptical than highly
educated Europeans’. Other controls in the results below
are individual-level sociodemographic variables, where
gender is measured using a binary measurement (male,
female) and age is measured using a continuous measure.
Results
Table 1 includes a build-up of four models of the multilevel
logistic regression results on the effect of RLP positions on
European integration on voter choice. In all models, a sta-
tistically significant effect indicates that a Eurosceptic
position will improve the possibility of an individual
choosing to vote for a RLP. This result is robust to adding
controls in Model 2. From a party competition perspective,
voters have a multidimensional choice. They are usually
presented with pro-EU parties (such as the centre-right or
social democrats) or Eurosceptic parties (such as the radical
right). Past research has shown how a two-dimensional
analysis of voters and parties changes the party competi-
tion, as ‘left-authoritarian views are held by many voters
across Europe but find no direct correspondence at the
party level’ (Lefkofridi et al., 2014: 79; Thomassen,
Table 1. Regression results on vote choice for RLPs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RLP EU Position .892* (.498) .855* (.512) 1.224*** (.429) 1.056*** (.318)
Left-Right Self-Identification Scale .57*** (.026) .565*** .565*** (.03) .565*** (.03)
.855*
Mainstream Left EU Position 1.504 (1.043) .349 (.909)
Mainstream Right EU Position .361 (.825) .947 (.981)
RRP Presence 2.731 (1.705)
RLP Economic Position 1.796* (.975) 1.773* (.983) 1.862* (1.032) 1.652** (.75)
Migration Rate .089 (.164) .09 (.176) .076 (.152) .088 (.106)
Small Business Owners .152 (.155) .152 (.155) .151 (.155)
Technical (semi-)professionals .046 (.148) .046 (.148) .046 (.148)
Production workers .038 (.212) .038 (.212) .038 (.212)
(Associate) Managers .081 (.21) .081 (.21) .081 (.21)
Clerks .027 (.163) .027 (.163) .026 (.163)
Socio-Cultural (semi-) professionals .189 (.201) .189 (.201) .19 (.201)
Service Workers .024 (.209) .024 (.209) .025 (.209)
Education: Upper Sec þ Non-Tert. .377** (.167) .379** (.167) .379** (.167)
Education: Tertiary .465** (.23) .466** (.23) .467** (.23)
Age .007** (.003) .007** (.003) .007** (.003)
Gender .007 (.04) .007 (.04) .007 (.04)
Constant .347 (1.267) 0.195 (1.226) 6.508 (5.416) 5.201 (8.85)
Sd(Country) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) .122 (.495) .008 (.04)
Sd(Country*Study) 8.371 (5.905) 8.323 (5.872) 8.001 (4.930) 6.867* (3.617)
Obs. 40860 36231 36231 36231
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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2012). As centre-left parties often find themselves as pro-
EU, RLPs can use this space to optimize the votes from the
left-authoritarian voters.
Models 3 and 4 control for competition and the coeffi-
cient of RLP EU position is statistically significant and
higher in comparison to Models 1 and 2. I included the
position of the main centre-left party on the EU, the posi-
tion of the main centre-right party on the EU (Model 3) and
the existence of a RRP in the party system (Model 4). The
reasoning behind including the radical right existence in the
competition control is that the radical right would include a
party that owns the hard Eurosceptic issue. The centre left
could be one of the main competitors of RLPs in a given
party system and is therefore essential to control for. The
centre-right is included for the purpose of accounting for
the voter’s options, instead of it having a direct impact on
the positioning of RLPs.
For the controls, unsurprisingly voters who identify
more to the right are less likely to vote for a RLP. This
finding will be further analysed later, in Figure 2. Another
interesting control is RLP economic position, indicating
that a more right-wing economic position is rewarded. This
has been shown in the literature, as a more moderate eco-
nomic position can be helpful for RLPs (Krause, 2020).
Table 1 shows no significant class indicators however edu-
cation shows significant effects in all models. Although
I find some effects in Table 1 for younger voters, the
coefficient is relatively small and would most likely not
hold up to substantial interpretation.
Figure 1 visualizes a decrease in the probability to vote
for a RLP when the position of the RLP becomes more pro-
EU integration. Figure 1 is based on the results in Table 1,
Model 3 to account for mainstream competition, excluding
a control for challenger parties. Challenger parties will be
closely examined in Figure 3. The histogram on the x-axis
of Figure 1 shows the distribution of the European integra-
tion position among RLPs. The distribution is relatively
diverse and thus this is an important and interesting finding.
However, it is important to note that there is a lack in
datapoints on the extremes of this scale.
Table 1 does not supply enough information to support
the hypotheses as we are still unsure whether potential
voters, who in this research are assumed to be left-wing
voters, are responding to Eurosceptic positions of RLPs.
Therefore, it is necessary to interact these variables. Table 2
Model 1 shows the two-way interaction between the EU
Position of RLPs and left-right self-identification of the
voters. Model 2 shows a three-way interaction between the
above, EU Position of RLPs and left-right self-
identification, and the presence of a RRP in the party sys-
tem. This research argues that radical right entry into a
party system will change the perception of Euroscepticism
and voters may find themselves identifying Euroscepticism
with the cultural rather than the economic dimension. In
Figure 1. Predicted probability of RLP vote along EU positions (seven meaning in favour of EU integration and one fully against EU
integration). Based on Table 1 Model 3.
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Table 2, the coefficient of the effect of RLP EU Position on
vote choice increases in both Models from the previous
results displayed in Table 1. The displayed interactions
between the EU positions of RLPs and the left-right self-
identification are not statistically significant. It is important
to note that when examining this result more closely in
Figure 2, this interaction is not consistently insignificant.
In the relevant parts for this research, among the left-wing
voters, the effect is significant. In a similar vein, there are
no consistent significant effects for the three-way
Figure 3. Predicted Probability of Eurosceptic RLP vote interacted with left-right self-placement and RRP presence, controlling for
mainstream party position on EU integration. Based on Table 2 Model 2.
Figure 2. Predicted probability of RLP vote interacted with left-right self-placement controlling for mainstream party position on EU
integration. Based on Table 2 Model 1.
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interaction in Table 2 Model 2, however the effect is sta-
tistically significant among the most left-wing voters.
While the interactions are displayed in Table 2, interpreting
those in this form is unintuitive and therefore, these results
will be visualized.
Figure 2 shows an interaction between left-right self-
identification of voters and the position that RLPs choose
to take on the EU, from Table 2 Model 1. The way the results
are presented in Figure 2 understand the position on EU
integration as dichotomous, meaning that a party is either
in favour of EU integration or against EU integration.12 The
graph depicts a clear advantage to being Eurosceptic for
RLPs. This supports H1 as the predicted probability of
voting for a RLP is higher with a Eurosceptic position than
with a pro-EU position. Although the confidence interval of
the Eurosceptic strategy is larger than for the pro-EU strat-
egy (due to data availability), the predicted numbers are still
showing a significant gap and relationship. Looking at the
self-identification voter interaction with RLP EU position,
there is a significant difference in the likelihood of very
left-wing voters to vote for a RLP depending on their EU
position. The further right-wing the scale goes the more
strategies converge. This is exactly as expected as the more
right-wing people self-identify, the less likely they are to
vote RLP overall. While this is most likely the case, in terms
of operationalization the self-identification variable serves
as a proxy, as the exact meaning that voters place on the left-
right dimension is ambiguous. This indirect test is also a
good way to avoid endogeneity in the results.
Figure 2 shows that a Eurosceptic position of RLPs is
more beneficial in gaining votes from left-wing voters. An
alternative interpretation by looking at the slopes is that
parties with a pro-EU position are relatively more success-
ful among centre-left voters, whereas ideological extre-
mism is more important for Eurosceptic parties, as they
are much more successful among voters with extreme posi-
tions. However, looking at the overall probability of voting
for a RLP, it is higher for a Eurosceptic position up to left-
right identification 5, after which the probability of voting
for a RLP, independent of its EU position, is unlikely.
So far, the research has shown that RLPs will be more
successful, when choosing a Eurosceptic position.
Although the figure above includes the positions on EU
integration of mainstream parties, it does not show all the
possible competition that RLPs could face on Euroscepti-
cism. Figure 3 shows a three-way interaction between RLP
EU position, left-right self-placement, and the presence of
RRPs in a party system. For ease of visualization, the posi-
tion of RLPs on EU integration has been held constant at a
Eurosceptic position. Figure 3 supports H2. This interac-
tion shows the predicted probability of voting for a RLP
with Eurosceptic position, when there is a RRP present or
not. Overall, Figure 3 shows that the more left-wing voters
self-identify, the more likely they are to vote for a RLP,
irrespective of the presence of a RRP. The larger confi-
dence interval in the nonexistence of RRPs is due to data
availability.
The predicted probability of voting for a Eurosceptic
RLP is higher when there is no RRP in the party system.13
This is only the case though when the voter is between 0
and 2 on the left-right self-placement scale. Similarly to
Figure 2, a convergence in the effect towards the right end
of the self-identification spectrum can be noted, as these
voters are less likely to support RLPs irrespective of the
factors analysed in this research. Figure 3 displays this
more clearly than in Figure 2, as a Eurosceptic positioning
overall appeals to voters who identify between 0 and 4 on
the left-right self-placement scale.
Table 2. Regression results with interactions.
(1) (2)
RLP EU Position 1.265*** (0.307) 1.334*** (0.302)
Left-Right Self-
Identification
0.571*** (0.156) 0.730*** (0.092)
RLP EU Position  Left-
Right Self-
Identification
0.002 (0.040) 0.036 (0.028)
Radical Right Presence 5.376** (2.638)
Radical Right Presence 
RLP EU Position
0.777 (0.719)




Radical Right Presence 




RLP Economic Position 1.848** (0.878) 1.563** (0.702)
Mainstream Right EU
Position
0.219 (0.813) 0.821 (0.987)
Mainstream Left EU
Position
1.426 (0.980) 0.353 (0.902)
Migration Rate 0.078 (0.129) 0.096 (0.106)
Education: Upper Sec þ
Non-Tert.
0.379** (0.168) 0.385** (0.167)
Education: Tertiary 0.466** (0.230) 0.473** (0.228)
Small Business Owners 0.152 (0.155) 0.149 (0.153)
Technical (semi-
)professionals
0.046 (0.148) 0.044 (0.147)
Production workers 0.038 (0.211) 0.039 (0.210)
(Associate) Managers 0.081 (0.211) 0.080 (0.209)
Clerks 0.027 (0.162) 0.022 (0.162)
Socio-Cultural (semi-)
professionals
0.189 (0.201) 0.193 (0.200)
Service Workers 0.024 (0.208) 0.027 (0.207)
Age 0.007** (0.003) 0.007** (0.003)
Gender 0.007 (0.040) 0.007 (0.042)
Constant 6.707 (5.297) 5.683 (8.544)
Sd(Country) 0.002 (0.014) 0.000 (0.000)
Sd(Country*Study) 7.836 (4.957) 6.591* (3.622)
Obs. 36231 36231
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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This is overall an important finding. Although it would
be beneficial for RLPs to be Eurosceptic, there is a caveat
to this finding. In most countries today, RRPs are present in
the party system. Therefore, the findings in Figure 3 are
important in order to understand the full picture. This
means, that although Figure 2 shows that a Eurosceptic
position is rewarded by voters, RLPs are not fully in charge
of their election results, as this is constrained when a RRP
is present in the party system. This constrain may come
from the general issue ownership and emphasis of RRPs
over Euroscepticism, which makes them appear more com-
petent on the issue, or it could simultaneously come from
cultural Eurosceptics shifting their vote from RLPs to
RRPs, due to the nature of their Euroscepticism. This result
also shows that the lack of cultural shift is not the reason
why RLPs are not as successful as their radical right
counterparts.
Conclusion
As the EU has become a more salient and polarizing issue
in Western European party systems, many parties need to
carefully consider where they stand on EU integration.
Through the rise of RRPs, many left parties have been
losing voters to the right (Jylhä et al., 2019). Whether or
not mainstream left parties can gain these voters back
through a Eurosceptic or cultural right positioning has been
addressed in the discipline (Abou-Chadi and Wagner,
2020), however we know very little about the possibility
of RLPs changing their position to maximize their votes
from the economic left and cultural right. There is a sub-
stantial number of voters who are on the authoritarian left
spectrum that are not represented by political parties (Hil-
len and Steiner 2020). In terms of ideology, RLPs are more
flexible than their centrist competition to change their posi-
tions on non-economic issues like European integration as
shown through the noticeable variance in the existing posi-
tions of RLPs in Western Europe; can a Eurosceptic posi-
tion be useful in order to maximize the votes for RLPs?
The results show that RLPs can benefit from a Euro-
sceptic position. This on its own is an important finding.
RLPs are mostly associated with their clear position on pro-
redistribution economic preferences, yet this shows that
non-economic positions also matter to their voters. RLPs
are better off positioning themselves Eurosceptic than pro-
EU – the difference in preferences on this issue becomes
clearer the more left-wing voters are. As we can assume
that most RLP voters have a left-wing economic prefer-
ence, this finding is important to show that there is a voter
base preference on where RLPs stand on EU integration.
Yet, if a Eurosceptic party family enters a party system,
is this finding stable? When RRPs enter a party system,
they are typically associated with Eurosceptic and nation-
alist ideology. Thus, even if RLPs are Eurosceptic, when a
more credible or extreme Eurosceptic party enters the party
system, RLPs benefit from a Eurosceptic position will be
constrained. This is an important finding as it clarifies the
question of whether RLPs can accommodate to RRPs
through taking their positions. Some of the reasons for this
dynamic may be found might be the ownership of RRPs on
Euroscepticism or the priorities of voters on cultural Euro-
scepticism. This means that from a voter’s perspective, a
voter may have a cultural Eurosceptic preference but will
vote for a RLP if they supply an economic Eurosceptic
position. With the presence of a cultural Eurosceptic party,
this voter will be likely to no longer vote for a Eurosceptic
RLP. Overall, this is significant for all parties, not just
RLPs, as this study adds to the growing literature of posi-
tion shifts of challenger parties and shows that non-
economic issues are important for voters to decide their
electoral choices.
From here, future research should investigate the voter’s
preferences and party positions on cultural or economic
Euroscepticism and how this affects vote choice. Future
research should also consider understanding vote choices
of non-voters, as those may be more actively mobilized
through change in non-economic positions by RLPs. As
previously found in the literature, those with authoritarian
left-wing preferences are less satisfied with democracy
(Hillen and Steiner 2020) and thus, may be less likely to
participate in elections. If RLPs fill this demand, does the
increase vote maximizing come from mobilization of non-
voters? This would be a very interesting future research
path.
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Notes
1. See Table A1.
2. Yet, while those with a lower income tend to be more likely to
support RLPs; the same does not apply on the aggregate level,
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meaning when a country is going through economic hardship,
radical left success becomes less likely (Visser et al., 2014).
3. Electoral success of Eurosceptic parties encourages main-
stream parties to move towards anti-EU positions; Euroscep-
tic RLPs are able to cause positional adjustment among
centre-left parties (Meijers, 2017).
4. This is in opposition to ‘hard’ Euroscepticism, which
describes usually RRPs ‘who object in principle to the idea
of any European economic or political integration’ (Taggart
and Szczerbiak, 2004: 3).
5. ‘All tests of spatial models in comparative politics rely on the
ability to estimate party positions’, as there is no direct way of
knowing a party’s position (Slapin and Proksch, 2008: 705).
6. See Appendix for robustness check using manifesto data.
7. Irish Sinn Fein was not included as it is also commonly iden-
tified as a nationalist party.
8. To account for this discrepancy of the two datasets, I include
a control in the Appendix.
9. This is a possible limitation in the case selection as this
restricts the data of Greece to ESS rounds 1, 2, 4 and 5. While
in 2010, SYRIZA was not major government party, this is a
conservative case selection to avoid data being driven by high
election results in subsequent years.
10. A list of RLPs can be found in the Appendix.
11. See Appendix for elaboration on country-level controls (A3
and A4).
12. As this is a seven-point scale, this was operationalized by
using the second most extreme position on pro-EU and
anti-EU. The results are robust to other operationalizations
of this dichotomization.
13. In line with the theory, pro-EU positions cause no difference
on RRP presence (see A5).
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Gómez-Reino M and Llamazares I (2013) The populist radical
right and European integration: a comparative analysis of
party–voter links. West European Politics 36(4): 789–816.
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